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Steven D. Brown & Abigail Locke 
 
Chapter in Wendy Stainton Rogers & Carla Willig (Eds) (2008). Handbook of 
Qualitative Methods in Psychology. London: Sage. 
 
Most traditional histories of social psychology single out the two key works in the late 
nineteenth century as the founding moments for the discipline – Le Bon’s study of 
crowd behaviour and Triplett’s experimental research on social facilitation. Le Bon’s 
(1895) The Crowd is a dense text ‘philosophical’ treatise on the ‘minds’ and 
‘opinions’ of crowds. This is illustrated by observations the author makes on the 
events around the fall of the Paris Commune. In stark contrast, Triplett’s (1898) work 
is a more modest attempt to understand ‘competitiveness’ – how the presence of 
others seems to encourage individuals to apply greater efforts in the accomplishment 
of some task. Whilst reference is made to bicycle racing competitions, Triplett’s work 
uses an experimental design where two children are engaged in a somewhat bizarrely 
staged task involving fishing reels. 
 
What is interesting about these two works is how very different they seem. Le Bon 
uses ‘real world’ examples, but only as a way of illustrating a theory of crowd 
behaviour he has already worked out in advance (i.e. a ‘deductive’ procedure). 
Triplett uses experimental data, but treats this data as a window onto ‘natural laws’ 
which he does not know in advance (i.e. an ‘inductive procedure’). On another level, 
whilst Le Bon has a clear political position – ‘mobs’ are dangerous and need to be 
controlled by the state – Triplett seems to have very little sense of there being any link 
between the behaviour of individuals and the social and cultural milieu they live 
within.  
 
The point we want to make is that from its very inception social psychology has been 
a wildly diverse field. In formal terms it has veered between a taste for grand 
theorising (e.g. Self-Categorization Theory) and a preference for pointing out small 
regularities in human behaviour (e.g. Fritz Heider’s work on errors and biases). In 
methodological terms it has embraced both large scale observational work (e.g. 
Festinger’s classic study When Prophecy Fails) and the design of highly intricate and 
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at times controversial experimental settings (e.g. Zimbardo’s notorious Stanford 
Prison Experiment). And in political terms, social psychologists appear torn between 
making explicit statements (e.g. Tajfel’s work on categorisation and prejudice) and 
denying that the political has any relevance to their individual research programmes 
(see Frances Cherry’s marvellous 1995 analysis of this tendency). 
 
In this chapter we want to show how qualitative methods fit into this very confusing 
and contradictory field. We will evaluate the place of qualitative methods according 
to the three criteria used above – formal, methodological, political. Or put slightly 
differently: what do qualitative researchers claim they are doing, how do they go 
about doing it and what do they see as the relevancy of their work? What we hope to 
show is that whilst qualitative methods do in many ways differ from the quantitative 
and experimental techniques which have dominated social psychology (notably US 
social psychology) over the past sixty years, these differences also mark some points 
of deep similarity.  
 
In the first part of the chapter we will put these differences and similarities in context 
by showing how two rival versions of ‘social psychology’ grew up in psychology and 
sociology. We will then describe how the so-called ‘crisis’ in European Social 
Psychology brought the two ‘social psychologies’ back into contact. In the main part 
of the chapter we then outline the different qualitative methods which were developed 
in (psychological) social psychology as a consequence of this renewed contact. By 
way of conclusion, we will assess the future prospects for qualitative methods in 
social psychology. At the end of the chapter we have included a worked example 
where we contrast the various approaches.  
 
The ‘Two Social Psychologies’ 
In his historical work, Robert Farr (1995) points out that there are two distinct 
traditions of work which call themselves ‘social psychology’. One is the well-known 
branch of psychology which we have been describing. But there is a second and 
wholly separate branch of sociology also called ‘social psychology’. We will offer a 
brief characterisation of each in turn.  
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The first social psychology (or ‘psychological social psychology’) has its origins in 
European Psychology. Historically, psychology in Europe has experienced 
considerable difficulty in establishing its place in the broader divisions of knowledge 
and academic life. The subject matter of psychology – human activity and mental life 
– suggest that psychology has its place amongst the humanities as a form 
‘Geisteswissenschaft’ (the study of culture). But European psychologists at the turn of 
the nineteenth century sought to align the fledgling discipline with the more powerful 
disciplines and faculties of medicine and exact science as a form of 
‘Naturwissenschaft’ (the natural sciences).  
 
By and large, social psychology has followed the path of its parent discipline. Whilst 
early European work in social psychology (e.g. Bartlett, 1932; McDougall, 1925) 
explicitly drew upon work in other humanities such as anthropology, by the 1950s 
psychological social psychology was dominated by a natural science orientation 
towards experimentation and quantification. At the same time, the research agenda for 
the discipline was set by social psychologists based in the USA (e.g. Allport, Asch, 
Festinger). This dominance of North American research was further extended in the 
period immediately after the end of the second world war, when US finance and 
expertise was brought into Europe as in an attempt to unify the research community 
split asunder by the turmoil of war years and the flight into exile of many former 
leading lights (e.g. Kurt Lewin; Fritz Heider), which it was also hoped would serve as 
part of the intellectual buttress against Communism that the US was then desperate to 
enable in Western Europe. Between 1950-1975 it is fair to say that psychological 
social psychology was an experimental science dominated by the overarching model 
and ideology of North American psychology.  
 
In the case of the other social psychology (or ‘psychological sociology’), the situation 
is curiously reversed. This tradition emerged in US sociology, mostly around the 
‘Chicago School’ which flourished around George Herbert Mead and his successors. 
Working within a discipline which is central to the study of culture, sociologists have 
traditionally not suffered from the same ‘identity problems’ which beset 
psychologists. They have instead been concerned with the best means to study ‘social 
forces’. Classically large samples of statistical data on, for example, suicide rates, 
household consumption patterns, voting preferences, have been the mainstay. These 
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samples are used as the basis to impute regularities in social structure which are then 
‘reproduced’ or ‘lived out’ by individuals who take on certain characteristics and 
viewpoints as a consequence (as in Max Weber’s ‘ideal-typical’ forms). This kind of 
approach reached its height in the functionalist system theory of Talcott Parsons in the 
1950s. 
 
But a counter-trend in sociology has emphasised the importance of approaching social 
forces in a different direction, by looking at how individuals make meaning and sense 
out of the social structures they inhabit. The generic term for this approach is ‘micro-
sociology’. Mead’s work, for example, emphasised that an individual’s personal 
understandings emerged through a kind of dialogue with the people and broader world 
around them or ‘symbolic interactionism’. Studying such understanding required the 
use of different methodologies, such as in-depth interviewing, observation and 
ethnography. In the post-war period, this kind work was given additional impetus by 
the rediscovery of a branch of European philosophy called ‘phenomenology’. 
Sociologists such as Alfred Schutz developed phenomenological terms such as 
‘lifeworld’ to show that whilst there may be general laws of society, at a micro level 
what matters is how persons interpret their world by drawing on local rules and 
rationalities. This insight was developed further in the ethnomethodology of Harold 
Garfinkel (1967). Between 1950-1975 it is then more or less accurate to describe 
psychological sociology as a minority voice arguing against the overarching model of 
a quantitative structural-functionalism derived from classical European sociology. 
 
The ‘Crisis in Social Psychology’ 
During the 1970s these two versions of social psychology unexpected came back into 
dialogue with one another. The period is referred to usually as ‘the crisis in social 
psychology’. It was sparked by the near simultaneous publication of three texts. 
 
In the USA, Kenneth Gergen’s article Social Psychology as History (1973), presented 
a blistering attack on dominant experimental model in social psychology. He noted 
that the reliance on supposedly value neutral ‘objective’ methods led social 
psychologists to be blind to the cultural and historical factors that shape social 
behaviour. He argued that to understand social processes we need to study how they 
have operated and changed over history – how social actions are fluid and dynamic - 
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and how in particular the practices of social psychology have changed and adapted 
over time. Gergen’s attack was particularly powerful since the author had been trained 
in precisely those methods he attacked so virulently. 
 
Rom Harré & Paul Secord’s (1972) The explanation of social behaviour argued 
against the ‘mechanism’ of much contemporary psychology. The authors – both 
philosophers – took issue with the default model of the person used in psychology 
(notably behaviourism). This model suggested that individual behaviour was the 
product of generic features of human nature which were essentially beyond the 
control of the person. The task of the social psychologist was then to uncover these 
generic features through experimental investigation (i.e. through ‘positivism’). Harré 
& Secord argued instead for a model of persons as wholly rational, complex agents 
whose behaviour was a product of their own contemplation and attempts to 
understand their world. They pointed to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
the symbolic interactionism of Mead and Erving Goffman as good examples. The task 
of the social psychologist would then be akin to that of an anthropologist, who would 
seek to discover the local rules in play in a given community and how these rules 
were interpreted by community members.  
 
In Europe, Israel & Tajfel (1972) edited a series of essays on The context of social 
psychology which similarly echoed the call to engage with wider social and cultural 
forces and to look beyond the narrow confines of experimentalism. Tajfel’s own 
contribution (‘Experiments in a vacuum’) neatly summarised the dangers that resulted 
from treating social psychological experiments as ends in themselves rather than as 
the starting point for developing propositions about social behaviour which would 
then have to be refined in dialogue with other social sciences. More seriously, this 
edited book reflected a sense on the part of many European social psychologists that 
US research had achieved such a level of dominance that it was able to erroneously 
assume that it provided universal insights into general human nature, rather than very 
specific insights about North American culture. The formation of a distinctive 
European Association for Experimental Social Psychology (EAESP) was then an 
attempt to ‘reclaim’ a form of social psychology uniquely suited to European cultures 
and societies. The EAESP also opened up dialogue with social psychologists in the 
USSR and Eastern Bloc states, where very different kinds of psychology were being 
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pursued, which emphasised collectivity and materialism over individualism and 
cognitivism. 
 
All three texts then echoed one another’s call for a change in the formal, 
methodological and political basis on which social psychology was to be conducted. 
The ‘crisis’ which subsequently followed involved a great deal of public debate about 
the strength and weaknesses of these arguments and about what the implications 
might be of putting these changes into practice. It was within this context that a 
number of qualitative approaches became adopted. We will refer to these as the ‘first 
wave’ of qualitative methods.  
 
The ‘First Wave’: 1975-1990 
The key texts of the crisis literature had all called for change in social psychology. To 
some extent ‘experiments’ became seen as emblematic of all that was wrong with the 
discipline. The search for new methods then became at the same time shorthand for 
doing social psychology differently. However, the majority of the crisis literature 
proved to be very thin in terms of specific recommendations for appropriate 
methodologies. This left a generation of researchers in the unfortunate position of 
being ‘against’ experiments but with little sense of the alternatives (i.e. what they 
were actually ‘for’). In the late 1970s the ‘ethogenic’ and ‘hermeneutic’ approaches 
came to fill this void, followed in the mid-1980s by Q-methodology and discourse 
analysis. 
 
The ‘crisis’ created a schism in the UK social psychology community. This was 
demonstrated most starkly at Oxford University in the early 1970s where two versions 
of social psychology were pursued in parallel. Based in the Department of 
Experimental Psychology, Michael Argyle worked out a programme of research in 
interpersonal behaviour using classic experimental paradigms. Literally up the road, at 
Lineacre College, Rom Harré worked out an alternative version of social psychology 
based around what he termed ‘ethogenics’. In formal terms, ethogenics is an attempt 
to develop an empirical programme for social psychology along the lines of the 
‘philosophical anthropology’ promoted by Wittgenstein. Crudely this means 
uncovering the local, culturally specific ‘rules of production’ which persons draw 
Ethogenics 
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upon to render their world meaningful. As Parker (1989: 21) and others have noted, 
ethogenics has three main principles: “the idea of an expressive order; a description of 
that order as drama; an understanding of social rules”.   
 
According to Harré, social life can be divided into two very different realms – a 
‘practical order’ which covers physical needs and the actions which are required to 
satisfy them, and an ‘expressive order’ which covers social needs, such as self-
esteem. It is this latter realm which is the proper subject matter for social psychology. 
Harré argues that the expressive order is best approached through the ‘dramaturgical 
model’ of social life developed by Goffman, amongst others. This model sees social 
behaviour as akin to a ‘performance’ which social actors must learn to acquire in 
order to successfully accomplish various activities. These performances are in turn 
governed by local rules which establish what can be counted as ‘proper’ and 
‘improper’ acts. For example, in Marsh et al’s (1976) study of football hooliganism, 
the focus is on the ‘moral careers’ of football fans. Here becoming a football fan is 
seen as a complex dramaturgical performance, where individuals have to learn the 
‘social rules’ which govern fan behaviour (e.g. showing the ‘right’ amount of 
aggression, but also knowing the limits). The data for the study was taken from 
participant observation along with interviews with fans. As a consequence the 
researchers faced the immediate problem that there appeared to be a gap between how 
fans described their behaviour at football matches, emphasising their own violent 
conduct, and the actual behaviour typically seen at such events. Marsh et al resolved 
this by claiming that fans improve their own standing as ‘hooligans’ by colluding in 
the pretence that football violence is disorderly when they are aware, in some sense, 
that actually their behaviour follows social rules. The broader and somewhat 
conservative political point that Marsh et al make is that ultimately social life consists 
of rule-following, although it often useful for individuals to deny this to themselves, 
in order to feel like a free, creative agent (see Parker, 1989). 
 
Hermeneutics is a philosophical tradition concerned with the reading and 
interpretation of texts, typically sacred works such as the Jewish Talmud or the 
Christian Bible. The fundamental principle of hermeneutics is that the meaning of a 
text is interrelated with the historical conditions and local practices in which the text 
Hermeneutics 
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is constituted. Since these conditions and practices are not available in the same way 
to readers as time passes, they must ‘reconstructed’ in order to uncover the layers of 
meaning which the text acquires (i.e. the Talmud as it is read by contemporary readers 
is the product of centuries of interpretative traditions which are ‘layered’ on top of 
one another). In the late 1970s, John Shotter, working as a developmental 
psychologist in the experimental psychology department at the University of 
Nottingham, saw a new way of applying hermeneutics to psychological data. Shotter 
worked with video recordings of mother – infant interactions. Traditionally, 
developmental psychologists would ‘read’ the behaviour of infants and mothers by 
drawing on existing theories, such as Piagetian structural-development theory. For 
Shotter, this was rather like the situation where a reader interprets a novel or a 
scripture in their own terms without paying any attention to the context in which the 
text was itself written. The hermeneutic approach would then reconstruct the context 
in which the behaviour of mother and infant makes sense to one another, rather than 
‘reading’ their behaviour through an external theory. Shotter’s work attempted to 
develop theories of ‘play’ and ‘maternal interaction’ from the bottom-up by 
reconstructing the context of behaviour in this hermeneutic fashion. 
 
Gergen et al (1986) extended this work by observing that social psychologists fail to 
appreciate how their own methods and measures may themselves be interpreted. 
Gergen et al asked student participants to look at items drawn from the Rotter locus of 
control scale which had been randomly assigned to a variety of personality traits. 
Participants were able to make highly articulate claims about why each item might 
plausibly be seen as evidence of a particular personality, despite the fact that the 
associations were entirely random. Gergen et al claimed that this demonstrated the 
sophisticated ways in which persons could reconstruct contexts to make these links 
meaningful. The political point here is that academic psychology is just one 
hermeneutic practice amongst other. It is a way of ‘reading’ behaviour, but one which 
fails to recognise that the particular interpretations it makes are just that – rather 
partial and limited readings based upon a reconstruction of context. 
 
As we have seen in the case of hermeneutics, many social psychologists who looked 
towards qualitative methods in the late 1970s and early 1980s were working in 
Q-Methodology 
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traditional Departments of Psychology where experimental methods were dominant. 
At the University of Reading, Rex Stainton Rogers had also developed a hermeneutic 
approach to personality testing. Stainton Rogers was similarly concerned with 
showing that the interpretative powers of ordinary persons far exceeded the rather 
limited models used by social psychologists, but was also concerned with the means 
by which this could be systematically demonstrated through a method capable of 
representing the complex structure of lay or everyday interpretations. In order to 
capture this, Stainton Rogers drew on the notion of ‘operant subjectivity’ (see Brown, 
1980) originally devised by William Stephenson. In his work, Stephenson had treated 
‘personality’ as a constellation of possible opinions and responses which a person 
might make, whose precise form shifted according to the context in which the person 
found themselves. Hence at any given moment someone’s expressed (or ‘operant’) 
position on a topic represents a conscious choice (hence ‘subjectivity’) out a range of 
possible positions. The task of the social psychologist is then to map the contours of 
this constellation, in relation to specific issues and concerns, and to demonstrate how 
persons shift between positions. 
 
Stephenson had developed an unusual written statement sorting task called a ‘Q sort’ 
as a device for capturing operant subjectivity. In collaboration with Wendy Stainton 
Rogers, Q-methodology was developed into a social psychological technique. Studies 
were conducted ranging from expressed subjectivity in relation to politics (R. Stainton 
Rogers & Kitzinger, 1985), health (W. Stainton Rogers, 1991) and emotions (Stenner 
& R. Stainton Rogers, 1998). Some of the best known work in this tradition is Celia 
Kitzinger’s (1987) studies of lesbian identities. Kitzinger used Q-methodology as a 
way of sampling the diversity of possible ways in which lesbianism might be 
‘constructed’ (that is, described and understood) ranging from sexual identity as 
personal preference to radical lesbianism as a strategic political choice. Q-
methodology, as developed by the Stainton Rogers’, was a curious mix of the old and 
the very new. Q-sorts themselves resemble traditional personality techniques, and 
indeed are in part quantitatively analysed. But since they allow for a vast number of 
possible connections to be made between statements, Q-sorts are able to reveal 
extremely complex interpretative structures and define the differences between 
distinct structures. Moreover these structures are themselves interpreted as cultural 
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and historical artefacts (see Curt, 1994). To this extent Q-methodology is seen as 
compatible with ‘social constructionism’. 
 
Potter & Wetherell claimed that since discourse analysis involved the close scrutiny 
of language then any ‘text’ was potentially analysable in this way. However in 
practice much of their data was derived from interviews (notably a study of racism in 
New Zealand, published as Wetherell & Potter, 1992) or from easily transcribed 
sources such as television programmes or newspaper articles. Discourse analysis 
differed from the other first wave approaches by taking a ‘hard-line’ approach to 
language. Whilst the other approaches had prioritised language use as the public 
means through which meaning and understanding is organised, they had nevertheless 
retained a role for traditional concepts such as historical and social forces, and even 
for cognition itself. Potter & Wetherell claimed that it was possible to ‘bracket out’ all 
such factors – in particular mental phenomenon – since they could demonstrate that 
social life could be analysed as it is organised through language and conversational 
Discourse Analysis 
The seminal text that brought discourse analysis into social psychology was Potter & 
Wetherell’s (1987) Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour, 
coming near the end of the first wave of qualitative methods. Discourse analysis as 
both a theoretical stance and a methodological perspective had a basis in sociology, in 
particular Gilbert & Mulkay’s (1984) work in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
(SSK), which had originally formulated the idea of interpretative repertoires (discrete 
sets of rhetorical formulations and concepts organised around a core metaphor) which 
Potter & Wetherell put at the heart of their version of discourse analysis. The method 
was promoted as a way of re-interpreting the subject matter of psychology itself, 
beginning in this instance with attitudes, but extended in later years to topics motives 
and intentions, emotions and cognition and memory. Formally, discourse analysis 
shared with all the other first wave methods the ambition of treating psychological 
processes as flexible, sophisticated everyday practices through which persons made 
sense of their social worlds. Methodologically, the approach insisted (as sociologists 
like Garfinkel had done) that rather than search for the supposed ‘causes’ of 
behaviour, social scientists ought to look at the rational ‘accounts’ persons give of 
their own conduct. 
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interaction entirely without reference to any other process. This resulted in an almost 
immediate backlash against the approach from both psychologists and sociologists 
who saw discourse analysis as offering little to their respective projects. More 
importantly it resulted in the charge that discourse analysis was politically impotent, 
since it could not offer analyses of large scale social and historical processes.  
 
The ‘Second Wave’: 1990-2005 
By the late 1980s, a range of qualitative techniques had begun to appear in social 
psychology. The common thread shared by all techniques was a commitment to a 
model of persons as sophisticated language users able to flexibly interpret and 
understand their social worlds. At the same time, the researchers using these 
techniques were engaged in a wholesale rejection of experimental methods and 
indeed, to some extent, the discipline that went with it. By the early 1990s however, 
the range of qualitative techniques in use and the growing tradition of studies made it 
a very real prospect to talk of a ‘qualitative social psychology’. One crucial marker 
was the decision by the British Psychological Society to include the teaching of 
qualitative methods as a compulsory requirement in all UK Psychology undergraduate 
degree programmes which it accredited. By the turn of the millennium, qualitative 
social psychological studies routinely featured in mainstream journals such as British 
Journal of Social Psychology and Journal of Language and Social Psychology as well 
as specialist journals such Discourse & Society. Whilst techniques such as Q 
methodology remained vibrant, the ‘second wave’ of methods mostly focussed on the 
technical analysis of discourse, but with very different aims. 
 
The application of discourse analysis to the study of psychological phenomena picked 
up speed in the early 1990s. Much of the work in this area came from a group of 
researchers at Loughborough University including Michael Billig, Derek Edwards, 
Jonathan Potter and Charles Antaki, who collaborated as the Discourse & Rhetoric 
Group (DARG). The term ‘discursive psychology’ was coined in a 1992 book by 
Edwards & Potter, who extended the hard-line stance of Potter & Wetherell. Whereas 
Discourse and Social Psychology had merely suggested the bracketing of mental 
process, Edwards & Potter aimed to show how the entirety of social psychology (and 
much of psychology to boot) could be reconstructed as the study of talk-in-
Discursive Psychology  
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interaction. In doing so, Edwards & Potter were effectively repeating the similar 
provocation which Harvey Sacks made to sociologists by claiming that the social 
order could only be empirically recovered through the analysis of ordinary, mundane 
conversational interactions. Psychological strongholds such as memory and cognition 
(Lynch & Bogen, 1996; Middleton & Edwards, 1990), emotions (Edwards, 1997, 
1999; Locke & Edwards, 2003), attributions (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and identity 
(Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995) were subject to a 
thorough reworking from a discursive point of view, with the result that ascriptions of 
mental states were considered for their role as interactional currency.  
 
The focus of discursive psychology changed over the period from 1990 to 2005. In 
1992, the focus was on fact construction, stake management and accountability (see 
also Potter, 1996 for work along these lines) encompassed in the (decidedly ironic) 
construction of the Discourse Action Model (DAM), published in the heartland of 
mainstream psychology, Psychological Review. A more comprehensive account of 
discursive psychology was provided in Edwards (1997) Discourse and Cognition 
where the influence of conversation analysis is more firmly felt, and more recently in 
Edwards & Potter (2005) whereby three overlapping strands of discursive psychology 
are outlined. These ranged from a discursive reworking of traditional psychological 
models, to looking at the interactional uses of psychological terms, and finally 
studying where psychological states are implied in discourse. Here the study of talk-
in-interaction in its own right is seen to not merely revolutionise social psychology, 
but to potentially do away with the need for the discipline at all. Indeed by 2005 
Wooffitt was given to note that ‘on occasions it would seem that the methodology of 
discursive psychology is hard to distinguish from that of CA’ (p.129; see also 
Silverman, 2006, for similar sentiments). In other words, discursive psychology had 
become, for many, a branch of conversation analysis. This is reflected in the 
increasing ‘ratcheting up’ of the methodological standards of discursive psychology, 
such that by the mid noughties,  interviews and focus group material were of interest 
merely as peculiar interactional settings with the use of naturally occurring data 
considered as the gold standard (see Potter & Hepburn, 2005; Puchta & Potter, 2004). 
For critics of the approach, the political questions of what exactly a fine grained 
attention to transcripts of conversation adds to analysis of pressing social and political 
questions remains ever more pertinent. The debate as to the actual differences 
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between much of the work coming under the labels of discursive psychology or 
conversation analysis (aside from one method being used by psychologists and the 
other by sociologists) still continues (see Edwards, 2006; Kitzinger, 2006; Potter, 
2006; Wooffitt, 2005, for recent work linking to this debate).  
 
In truth there is no clear set of methodological principle which unites work in the 
FDA tradition, beyond the common use of the term ‘discourse’ to refer to those 
understanding which are made available by a particular social practice existing within 
given field of power. The work of Ian Parker & Erica Burman (collaborating as the 
Discourse Unit at Manchester Metropolitan University) has contributed most to the 
development of this approach (see Parker et al, 1999; Parker & Burman, 1994). Parker 
& Burman insist that since power subsumes the entirety of any social world one can 
analyse practically any material, from government reports to interviews with 
professionals through even (notoriously!) to the instructions on a tube of children’s 
toothpaste (see Banister et al, 1989), for evidence of the ‘subject positions’ we are 
forced to adopt to understand ourselves. However, for the most part, FDA work tends 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
In the late 1970s a group of psychologists and sociologists began publishing a journal 
Ideology & Consciousness which explicitly aimed to develop the ideas of the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault in relation to psychology. In a series of articles (e.g. 
Adlam et al, 1978) they argued that since our thinking is intertwined with the 
historical development of social practice and state power, it follows that our self-
reflections on what we ourselves are (or ‘subjectivity’) is similarly structured. Hence 
the entirety of psychology must be considered from the perspective of the power 
mechanisms and structured modes of thinking with which they are associated (or 
‘discourses’ for shorthand) that have made us what we are. Nikolas Rose developed 
this approach most extensively (see 1985; 1989). The critical question then is – how 
does power produce subjectivity and how might we develop new forms of subjectivity 
that resist power? (see Henriques et al, 1984). In a piece of subsequent work, Wendy 
Hollway (1989) proposed an approach to the analysis of interview texts which would 
focus on the ‘subject positions’ that discourses allowed persons to adopt. This 




to be interview based, and broadly resembles the approach taken in early discursive 
psychological work. But it differs through its commitment to locating the analysis 
within a broader social theoretical framework derived from Foucault’s work. During 
the 1990s there was a series of fiercely argued exchanges between the Discourse Unit 
and DARG members, with the former arguing that the latter had reneged on any sense 
of the political, which was met with the counter-charge that Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis was methodologically unsophisticated and unable to provide the empirical 
evidence for the political claims its authors wished to make. 
 
Despite its widespread use in sociology, few psychologists have attempted to adopt 
grounded theory in its entirety (see Chamberlin, 1999; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992; 
Pidgeon, 1996 for exceptions). However Jonathan A. Smith did develop, along with 
collaborators, an approach which was broadly in line with the spirit and general 
approach of grounded theory, but which placed far less constraints on the researcher, 
and which as consequence could be readily taught to undergraduate and postgraduate 
students. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) works with texts, usually 
transcripts of interviews with carefully selected participants. It requires researchers to 
makes notes on the transcript, then to systematize these notes into ‘themes’ which are 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
One way of considering all of the qualitative work in the ‘second wave’ is to see it as 
the renewal of social psychology by sociological thinking. Thus discursive 
psychology took inspiration from the sociology of accounts (e.g. Garfinkel) and 
conversation analysis (e.g. Sacks) and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis drew heavily 
on then previous sociological interpretation of Foucault’s work (e.g. Turner, 1984; 
Rose, 1989). There was one other major sociological tradition which influenced social 
psychologists – the ‘grounded theory’ approach developed by Anselm Strauss and 
Barney Glaser. Grounded theory is a method which aims to provide a systematic 
process for inductively deriving ‘categories’ which can be developed into coherent 
theories. It demands that researchers minutely break down the transcript of an 
interview into tiny fragments of meaning (or ‘codes’) which are then assembled into 
broader ‘themes’. This process is repeated for every interview, with themes being 
continually revised, until the researcher feels that the themes proper capture the 
substance of what participants are describing.  
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then clustered together and subsequently compared across interviews to form ‘master 
themes’. IPA work grew rapidly in the late 1990s, dealing mostly with health related 
themes (e.g. sexual health, chronic pain, maternity). One impetus for its growth was 
the promise that it was possible to treat the texts that it studies as ‘windows’ onto 
participants’ cognitions. In this sense it is ‘phenomenological’. However such 
cognitions are inevitably mediated by both language and by the interpretive role of the 
analyst. In this sense the approach is ‘hermeneutic’. But as critics (e.g. Willig, 2001) 
came to note, this view of language is not especially phenomenological, since 
phenomenologists have a radically different view of thinking from cognitive 
psychologists. Moreover, the hermeneutic aspect of the approach rather pales in 
comparison with the wholesale attempt to reconstruct context in first wave 
hermeneutics and second wave Foucauldian Discourse Analysis.  
 
Future Prospects: 2005+ 
The dominant contemporary qualitative approaches in social psychology are versions 
of ‘discourse analysis’ and versions of ‘grounded theory’. Discursive Psychology and 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis remain the best examples of the former, whilst 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis and the newly emerging Thematic Analysis 
remain the most common instances of the latter. However, it is fair to say that in the 
past few years there has been an increasing diversity in how approaches are actually 
implemented. For example, it is common to see work using ideas derived from Potter 
& Wetherell’s version of discourse analysis married with a concern with power that is 
close to Parker & Burman’s notion of discourse. In general, qualitative work in social 
psychology seems, with some notably exceptions such as Discursive Psychology, to 
be becoming more heterogeneous and diversified rather than homogeneous and 
methodologically ‘purist’, as one might typically expect as a research tradition grows. 
In this section we will point to some of what we think are the most significant 
emerging trends. 
 
Thematic analyses have been around for a long time in a variety of forms, 
particularly, for example, in health psychology.  Thematic analysis shares close links 
with content analysis in that both are concerned purely with topic. However, thematic 
analysis is less concerned with representing frequency of participant themes. Classic 
Thematic analyses 
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texts around such analyses are from Miles & Huberman (1994), Boyatzis (1998), and 
more recently work by Joffe & Yardley (2004). In such methods, topics of concern 
are noted by going through the data, typically line by line, such that these topics can 
then be placed into larger categories or themes and sub-themes. As Joffe & Yardley 
note (2004), the themes that are produced can be either inductive or deductive. 
Deductive coding would be where the researcher codes the data in the light of a 
previous theoretical model. Once the theming of data has occurred, it is typical to 
compare coding with others in order to obtain inter-rater reliability.  
 
One reason why thematic analyses have come back into vogue is arguably that they 
are able to sidestep tricky epistemological concerns regarding constructionism or 
interactionism. Such thematic analyses are particularly useful for those qualitative 
researchers who operate within an applied and practical domain and want to analyse 
their qualitative data for topic content without considering any methodological horrors 
(Woolgar, 1996). Their continued existence and now resurgence are arguably a 
product of a desire by researchers not to become enmeshed in the formal 
epistemological concerns which have marked much of the debate around first wave 
and second wave methods, and also part of a political ambition to deliver 
straightforward answers to complex social psychological questions. It is not then 
surprising that thematic analyses are current taking off in the health-related end of 
social psychology. Thematic methodologies also enable researchers to combine 
qualitative and quantitative research – often seemingly without question. However, as 
some researchers have noted (e.g. Wood & Kroger, 2000) such analyses can be 
considered as being more quantitative than qualitative in nature and spirit, and adopt 
what Kidder & Fine (1987) have called a “little q” perspective on research.  
 
The hope of a dialogue between the two forms of social psychology is that it will be 
possible for to create a genuinely ‘social’ version of psychology. However, for some 
researchers this is a forlorn hope. Frosh (2003) doubts whether any amount of ‘social 
analysis’ will transform how psychology thinks about ‘individuals’, and equally 
worries that a turn towards ‘sociological reductionism’ is scarcely an improvement on 
the ‘psychological reductionism’ of traditional social psychology. For Frosh the 
problem is how to see ‘the individual’ and ‘society’ as genuinely intertwined. The 
Psychosocial Research 
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psychosocial approach developed by Frosh, along with other researchers such as Anne 
Phoenix, Margie Wetherell, Wendy Hollway and Tony Jefferson starts from the same 
assumption as practically all qualitative methods in social psychology, that thinking 
and action are shaped society and culture. But it grafts onto this the notion from 
psychodynamic theory that unconscious dynamics are a key motivational factor, albeit 
one that is in continuous dialogues with social forces. In practice what this means is 
viewing persons as shifting between different ‘subject positions’ in ‘discourse’, rather 
in the same way that Foucauldian Discourse Analysis proposes, in which they ‘invest’ 
unconsciously. 
 
Hollway & Jefferson’s (2000) Free Association Interview technique is currently 
gaining some ground. The method draws upon psychodynamic theory by making the 
relationship between the interviewer and interviewee central. The feelings and 
associations produced by the interviewer (what psychoanalysts usually call ‘counter-
transference’) are thought to be analytically significant. Methodologically this is 
problematic, not least because all of the first and second wave approaches were united 
in their rejection of any form of ‘depth psychology’ (i.e. claims to read unconscious 
processes in empirical material). However not all psychosocial research is so deeply 
influenced by psychodynamic theory (see Wetherell, 1999; 2005). Indeed some 
discursive researchers such as Mick Billig (1999) have proposed alternative ways that 
Freudian concepts might be used to enrich conversation and discourse analysis. 
Nevertheless, all psychosocial research is committed to the notion that social 
psychology, as it stands, has failed to provide a means of genuinely engaging with the 
social basis of individuality. 
 
During the ‘crisis’, many social psychologists were forced to clarify how they thought 
the discipline ought to fit with both general psychology and with the social sciences in 
general. A common view, following Tajfel (1980) was that social psychology was a 
set of ‘mid-range’ theories, covering the area somewhere between the individual and 
society. But this view suggests that we already understand both ‘individuals’ and 
‘society’, and simply need to join the two pieces of the puzzle together. Contemporary 
social theory (such as Hardt & Negri, 2000) suggests the reverse is true, that working 
out what kind of ‘societies’ we live in and what ‘individuals’ can be is the most 
Post-Foucauldian Analysis 
 18 
pressing political set of questions. Few social psychologists have responded to this 
view, since it requires, at the very least, seeing the discipline as in perpetual dialogue 
with other approaches.  
 
One exception is the work of Valerie Walkerdine, who has shifted through a series of 
collaborations with educational researchers (Counting Girls Out and Democracy in 
the Kitchen), media theorists (Mass Hysteria) and with culture studies (Growing up 
Girl). A key thread in Walkerdine’s research is that the basic categories of social 
psychology – identity, emotion, development – are all mediated by the cultural 
‘technologies’ which our contemporary societies provide. Thus gender, for instance, 
is not a neutral peg around which it is possible to develop some social psychological 
approach, but rather a contested political site which is being continually redefined 
with reference to the cultural dynamics in which women participate. Social 
psychologists then need to understand the changes which are being enacted around 
gender rather than come up with their own clear ‘concept’. Similarly, Middleton & 
Brown (2005) explore remembering as a set of changing processes rather than a clear 
cut field of enquiry. Post-Foucauldian analysis is then not so much an approach as a 
body of research united in ambition to study what it means to be a person and how 
this is rapidly changing in complex geo-politics of the early twenty-first century. 
Methodologically, most work in this area is highly varied (and thus not systematic or 
refined with respect to common criterion) drawing equally on interviews, naturalistic 
data, and increasingly internet based data. However politically the work shares the 
common perspective that it is the duty of the social researcher to invent concepts 
which not only capture the vicissitudes of contemporary life but also create new 
possibilities for thinking that life. 
 
Conversation analysis (CA) is certainly not a new methodology, nor is it a new 
discovery for social psychologists (Edwards published a comprehensive introduction 
in 1994!). As we have described, conversation analysis has been critical to the 
development of discourse analysis and discursive psychology. However, as we have 
also noted, some social psychologists now regard themselves as having become 
conversation analysts, and correspondingly see social psychology itself as having its 
legitimate destination in this approach. The initial ideas of CA were of course 
Conversation Analysis 
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developed by Harvey Sacks up until his death in the 1970s and have since been 
developed into a more concrete methodology by names such as Emmanuel Schegloff 
and Gail Jefferson. Sacks’ original work proposed a conversation analysis that looked 
at both the sequential components of talk and the categories that were utilised in talk 
(membership category devices). Interestingly in the years since his death, this second 
focus has developed into what some would regard as a separate methodology of 
Membership Category Analysis (MCA) one which is sometimes, though not always, 
tied to (sequential) CA. Mostly when people talk about using CA, they are referring to 
the sequential analysis of typically naturally occurring conversation.  
 
The idea that social psychology ought to end up as a branch of CA is obviously 
problematic. If we consider that social psychology still needs to consider something 
‘mental’ within it, what can a specific CA analysis offer that a DP analysis cannot?  
Social psychology by its very nature focuses on people, mental states (including 
discourses of) and social issues surrounding identity.  CA in its purest form, cannot 
add anything to this argument and to social psychology as a specific discipline in as 
much as psychology is by definition interested in mental states. However, there is 
ongoing debate as to the political potential of CA. This emerged in feminist 
psychology from the work of Kitzinger, Speer and Stokoe who have all demonstrated 
that issues around sexuality and gender can be studied at a micro-level of negotiation 
(and coercement) through CA (see Kitzinger, 2000; Speer, 1999; Stokoe, 2000).  
 
From a perspective of over thirty years onwards, we may now see that what the 
‘crisis’ achieved for social psychology was twofold. Firstly, it enabled social 
psychologists to consider the cultural and historical constraints and influences on its 
ideas and theories. Secondly, it enabled a more ecologically valid study of people in 
their natural environments, explaining and accounting for their actions and decisions. 
This was accomplished through introduction and flourishing of a range of qualitative 
methods, over three successive waves. However, it is important to note that this only 
one half of the story. Experimental social psychology not only survived the crisis 
more or less intact, but is currently ‘in a state of rude health’ (Brown, 2002: 70). 
Indeed journals such as the European Journal of Social Psychology publish 
experimental work almost exclusively, reflecting a broader picture in Northern 
Summary 
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Europe (with the exception of the UK), where social psychology is formally defined 
as much the same quantitative study of ‘social cognition’ that it has been since the 
1950s.  
 
Should we then conclude that the situation in the UK is a special case? Some 
commentators, not least the powerful panel of eminent psychologists charged with 
overseeing the 2001 Research Assessment Exercise (an audit of UK higher education 
research) certainly thought so. Their report concluded that social psychology was now 
split entirely between qualitative and experimental work, to the detriment of all. A 
working group set up by the BPS in 2004 to encourage dialogue across the rival 
camps was more optimistic, although many participants commented on the yawning 
chasm between their basic concepts and ideas of how to approach social phenomenon 
(see the special issue of The Psychologist 2005 on ‘Dialoguing across divisions’).  
 
We want to conclude our survey of qualitative methods in social psychology on a 
different note. We have used three criterion to discuss approaches: formal (i.e. 
epistemology), methodological (i.e. technical) and political (i.e. relationship to 
broader social world). Seen in these terms, it is clear that qualitative methods do not 
form a homogenous whole. For example, interpretative phenomenological analysis 
(IPA) makes completely different assumptions about mental life and its relationship to 
language to both discourse analysis and discursive psychology, yet many aspects of 
its technical procedures are striking similar to the initial stages of a early (i.e. Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987) form of discursive analysis. Moreover, in terms of its political 
ambitions to deliver specific policy oriented findings to a selected audience, the 
applied aspects of IPA share much with some versions of Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis, even though their formal theoretical basis could not be more different 
(Foucault famously rejected any form of phenomenology)!  
 
We suggest that if these same three criterion are applied across the supposed 
qualitative/quantitative divide then a better rounded picture of social psychology 
emerges. Rather than see work as split across a single division, in which all sorts of 
immensely varied issues are subsumed, we can see contemporary social psychology 
as a mosaic of approaches, with some far closer than is usually suspected. For 
example, conversation analysis seemingly stands in stark opposition to social 
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cognition, with the former in the main virulently against any reference to ‘mental 
states’ other than as rhetorical formulations (see the special issue of Discourse Studies 
8(1) on ‘Discourse, interaction and cognition’ (2006) for a larger debate on the role of 
cognition in conversation analysis), and the latter insisting that the broader social 
world only comes to exist for the individual in terms of cognitive representations. But 
methodologically the two approaches are strikingly similar – both involve the close 
analysis of complex datasets which can only be assembled from particular authorised 
sources purged of outside influence. The ‘naturalistic data’ on which the conversation 
analyst insists is the inverted mirror image of the ‘experimental data’ that the social 
cognition researcher demands.  Politically the two approaches are also bedfellows, in 
that they place priority on progress being made in the research programme itself 
above a concern with connecting findings to social policy. Indeed, one could argue, 
that to read a piece of conversation analytic social psychology, replete with technical 
details and typically culminating in highly specific points which are only explicable 
with reference to a very narrow tradition, is to be immediately reminded of the kind of 
classic experimental social psychology which provoked the crisis in the first place.  
 
We end then with a plea. Whilst qualitative methods clearly have the potential to 
deliver detailed, contextually grounded, socially-oriented and politically informed 
analyses, the mere choice of a method does not guarantee this. Methods alone 
determine neither the type of approach nor the political ambitions. By the same token, 
merely saying that a method is able to indicate underlying cognitions or reveal the 
social order in the form of talk-in-interaction does not guarantee that it will ultimately 
provide the evidence to demonstrate such claims. Ultimately technical choices around 
methodology are only a small part of the broad range of choices which confront us as 
social psychologists. Qualitative methodology does not guarantee the quality of 
research. That, as ever, is determined by a far wider set of concerns. 
 
EXAMPLE 
IDENTITY TRANSITIONS IN A MEMORY MUSEUM 
(The following example is a composite that draws upon themes from ongoing 




Karin is a Dutch woman in her late forties. Her mother, Maria is approaching eighty 
and is now living in an elderly care home facility – Humanitas – in Rotterdam. Over 
the past two years Maria has been displaying symptoms of dementia including 
memory loss and confusion. In recent months Maria’s memory lapses have been 
particularly acute and she sometimes confuses Karin with other people from her past 
or fails to recognise her altogether. Karin finds these occasions difficult to manage, in 
part because she does not know how to relate to her mother when she is not 
recognised as her daughter, and more importantly because these lapses make the 
ultimate loss of her mother seem closer. Karin also worries about how her children –  
Annemarie and Maarten – will cope with seeing their grandmother decline. 
Annemarie is now pregnant (her first child) and Karin wonders whether her own 
mother will see the baby, and if she does how she will respond. Humanitas has 
recently opened a ‘memory museum’ on site. This is a series of rooms which have 
been designed to resemble traditional Dutch homes and shops from the 1940s and 50s. 
The ‘living room’ for example, is filled with ornaments, pictures and fittings all 
designed to evoke memories of the time. The ‘shop’ is filled with goods – tins, 
adverts, jars of sweets – which have long since disappeared from everyday Dutch life. 
The elderly people at Humanitas and their families visit the museum together. Karin 
has visited the museum with Maria along with Annemarie and Marteen. She finds the 
visits enjoyable, since Maria is particularly animated and reminisces about times from 
her youth, but also deeply troubling because Maria makes little reference to their 
common family history, which she feels is gradually slipping away. 
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Ethogenics From an ethogenic perspective, what is of interest are the systems of rules 
that underpin social behaviour. A family has its own rules governing morally 
appropriate behaviour, for instance. Here interviews might be used to elicit from 
Karin why she is troubled by Maria not remembering the family past, and how this is 
related to the expansion of the extended family with the birth of her grandchild. Do 
families have a ‘duty to remember’? When are there exceptions? 
 
Hermeneutics There are clearly multiple layers of meaning at stake in the 
relationships within the extended family. Some of these are determined ‘officially’ – 
such as by Maria’s medically authorised status as ‘suffering from dementia’. Video 
recordings of interactions between the family members both inside and outside the 
museum might help peel apart some of these layers. For example, do the family 
members switch between treating Maria as a ‘patient’ who needs help and as a senior 
member of the family whose reminiscences should be valued and listened to 
uninterrupted? 
 
Q Methodology Q-sorts are best suited to exploring the ecology of cultural 
understandings that are brought to bear to understand a social phenomenon. Here a Q-
study might reveal the various ways in which ‘dementia’ is constructed. We would 
expect there to be a ‘medical’ construction, but are there other more personal 
constructions such as ‘dementia as loss of family’ or ‘dementia as moral passage’? 
The approach here would be to ask Karin and her family to complete the sort, along 
with other families.  
 
Discourse analysis Interviews with Karin and family members – perhaps even with 
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Maria herself – would be transcribed and then analysed to recover the ‘interpretative 
repertoires’ which are culturally available to make sense of dementia and ageing. 
These are likely to be clustered around a core metaphor – such as ‘ageing as 
increasing medicalisation’ or ‘ageing as natural deterioration’. It would be of 
particular interest to identify at what points in interviews family member switch 
between various repertoires and what social acts they may be thereby accomplishing 
(e.g. excusing guilt, justifying ill-feeling etc). 
 
Discursive Psychology From this perspective the relevant questions would be around 
the talk-in-interaction which occurs within the memory museum. High quality 
recordings transcribed to a very detailed (Jeffersonian level) would be required. The 
precise questions to be asked would be determined inductively as the analysis 
proceeded, and guided by traditional themes such as ‘stake inoculation’, 
‘categorization’ and ‘making mental ascriptions’.  However the discursive 
psychologist would be immediately drawn to any sign of ‘trouble’ in the interaction – 
that is moments where there are pauses, interruptions, or speakers repairing their own 
talk. What kind of social ‘business’ occurs in the memory museum? How is identity 
discursively managed and accomplished in the local interaction? 
 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis Power and subjectivity are the key concerns here. 
Maria is clearly embedded in some complex sets of power relations with the care 
home, including the ‘pastoral power’ or medicine and social welfare. What forms of 
subjectivity are granted to Maria as a ‘dementia patient’? Does she manage to resist or 
subvert this classification in any way? Identifying the relevant discourses in play 
could be done either through interviews or through recordings of interaction 
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(including interactions with care staff), but this would need to be supplemented with a 
broader historical and cultural analysis of Humanitas as a social institution. 
 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis IPA would approach the study of 
identity with regard to looking at how it is personally negotiated for those involved 
and would typically use semi-structured interviews as the preferred method of data 
collection .  For example, repeated interviews with Karin over time might recover 
some key themes which indicate the changing ways she comes to think about Maria 
and what is happening to her. Does she feel a conflict between her ‘responsibility as a 
daughter’ and her ‘becoming the senior member of the extended family’? IPA would 
assume that the interviewers own understandings inevitably inform the analysis. 
 
Thematic Analysis The approach here would be to recover broad themes that 
encompass the experience of ageing. This could be accomplished by assembling a 
broad corpus of interviews with people like Maria and their respective families. These 
would loosely transcribed and analysed for key terms. For example, is there a sense of 
‘guilt’ at having an elderly family member transferred to a care home? How is this 
then managed? The assumption would be that there are a limited set of key issues 
which it is possible for the analyst to recover from interviews which then account for 
the greater majority of the experience.  
 
Psychosocial Research Psychosocial approaches combine the social with the psyche 
and personal, although as we noted earlier some researchers operating from this 
perspective embrace psychodymanic sympathies more than others. The types of data 
used could vary from free association interviews to other sources of data including 
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media data (see Wetherell, 2006). The questions would be determined by an initial 
inductive search through the data, guided partly by looking for occasions where the 
interviewee displays ‘conflict’ of some sort. Does Karin’s conduct on her visits to 
Maria actually cover up a range of unconscious conflicts around her mother and 
indeed her own role as a mother (and soon to be grandmother)? In what discourses of 
ageing does Karin invest? 
 
Post Foucauldian Analysis Although there is no unified methodological approach 
here, the basis would begin by identifying the sort of ‘problem’ which ageing and 
dementia constitute. How is dementia configured socially? How does Humanitas as a 
social body facilitate the ‘performance’ of particular versions of ageing? Interviews, 
transcriptions of interactions and quasi-ethnographic notes taken by observers could 
all be used as the empirical base here. However one substantial part of the analysis 
would be trying to connect what is observed at Humanitas to broader theoretical 
debates across the social sciences. 
 
Conversation Analysis Based on ethnomethodological principles, the conversation 
analyst would regard Karin and Maria’s identities as accomplished in interaction and 
hence to be fluid and indexical (that is not separable from its context of utterance), 
rather than being fixed. In this way, conversation analysts would use ‘real’ or natural 
data of actual conversations in the memory museum and ask questions such as ‘how is 
this Maria’s identity being negotiated, constructed, and at times, resisted, across the 
turn-taking of this conversation’? Ideally video recordings of the interaction would be 
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